This note considers a variation of the full-information secretary problem where the random variables to be observed are independent and identically distributed. Consider X 1 , . . . , X n to be an independent sequence of random variables, let M n := max{X 1 , . . . , X n }, and the objective is to select the maximum of the sequence. What is the maximum probability of "stopping at the maximum"? That is, what is the stopping time τ adapted to X 1 , ..., X n that maximizes P (X τ = M n )? This problem was examined by Gilbert and Mosteller [1] when in addition the common distribution is continuous. The optimal win probability in this case is denoted by v * n,max . What if it is desired to "stop within a proportion of the maximum"? That is, for 0 < α < 1, what is the stopping rule τ that maximizes P (X τ ≥ αM n )? In this note both problems are treated as games, it is proven that for any continuous random variable X, if τ * is the optimal stopping rule then P (X τ * ≥ αM n ) ≥ v * n,max , and this lower bound is sharp. Some examples and another interesting result are presented.
Introduction
In the classical secretary problem (CSP) or the largest of an unknown set of numbers (Googol), a manager must select the best applicant among a known number n of applicants. There is only one position available and he will interview one by one in random order. Immediately after the interview he must decide whether or not the applicant is hired based only on the relative ranks of the applicants interviewed so far. An applicant once rejected cannot be recalled. It is well known that using the optimal strategy, the probability of success decreases monotonically to 1/e ≈ .3679 as n → ∞. For an entertaining exposition of the CSP see Ferguson [2] .
An immediate extension of the CSP is the full-information best-choice problem in which each applicant independent of the others, can receive a numerical score whose distribution is known in advance and the objective is to select the highest score. The mathematical framework for this problem is as follows. Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent random variables with known continuous distributions, let M n := max{X 1 , . . . , X n }, and consider sup τ P(X τ = M n ) where the supremum is over all stopping times adapted to the natural filtration of X 1 , . . . , X n . Gilbert and Mosteller [1] solved this optimal stopping problem when the sequence is independent and identically distributed. The optimal stopping rule depends on a sequence of decision numbers d i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so that a gambler must stop at the first observation i such that X i = M i and F (X i ) ≥ d i , or at time n if no such i exists. They computed the optimal win probability for some values of n, denoted by v * n,max , are shown in Table 1 . This optimal win probability is independent of the distribution of the X i 's. What if it is desired to "stop within a proportion of the maximum"? That is, for 0 < α < 1, what is the stopping rule τ that maximizes P (X τ ≥ αM n )? The examples in Section 2 will show that the optimal stopping rule is cumbersome to calculate and that the win probability depends on the distribution. Moreover there is no close form expression to compute the optimal win probability as examined in [1] . In this note these two problem are treated as games for comparison. Notation and definitions are now introduced.
Game Max. Win is to stop at an observation that is the maximum of the sequence;
Game Proportion of the Max. Win is to stop at an observation that is at least a proportion 0 < α < 1 of the maximum of the sequence;
Here τ is any stopping rule adapted to X 1 , . . . , X n .
For the i.i.d. sequence (X 1 , . . . , X n ) of random variables having the same distribution as X, let
• V n,max (X, τ ) be the probability of win playing the Game Max for X using the stopping rule τ ,
• V n,αmax (X, σ) be the probability of win playing the Game Proportion of the Max for X using the stopping rule σ,
• τ * be the optimal stopping rule for Game Max,
• σ * be the optimal stopping rule for Game Proportion of the Max,
A candidate is defined to be an observation that has a positive probability to win the game in question. In Game Max X i is a candidate if X i ≥ αM i . Thus, suppose a gambler is to observe X 1 , · · · , X n , he can win at observation i if X i is a candidate and the remaining n − i are no greater than X i . Similarly in Game Proportion of the Max, X i is a candidate if X i ≥ αM i . Note that if a gambler is playing both games when he wins in Game Max, he wins in Game Proportion of the Maximum as well. The converse is not necessarily true, this makes Game Proportion of the Max "easier" to win and hence the optimal win probability in Game Proportion of the Max is at least the optimal win probability in Game Max. The main result of this note makes this precise.
and the inequality is sharp.
Where the values for v * n,max were found by [1] and are given in Table 1 .
Although the Theorem is stated when the common distribution of X is continuous, allowing the distribution to be discrete should make the Game Proportion of the Max easier to win due to the ties. Hence the sharp lower bound should hold as well. It is not clear how to make a proof of this.
The idea of the proof is to examine the worst case for a gambler. This is, playing Game Proportion of the Max with a distribution space out enough so that the advantage over Game Max is lost. The adequate distribution is given in at the beginning of Section 3. Then in Lemma 3.1 it is proven that the win probability of Game Proportion of the Max is arbitrarily close to Game Max. Finally, using the respective optimal stopping rules from both games and the use of inequalities, Theorem 1.1 yields. 
Examples
The following distributions are examined: discrete uniform and uniform. The following win probabilities are needed for computations, for k = 1, . . . , n let
where max ∅ := −∞. Denote the expression in the first case above simply by U k (x k ), and note that
is interpreted as the win probability if stopping at time k after observing X 1 = x 1 , . . . , X k = x k , and W k (x 1 , . . . , x k ) as the optimal win probability when taking at least one more observation after observing
Example 2.1. Discrete Uniform Distribution. Let P (X = x) = p(x) = 1/10 for x = 1, 2, . . . , 10.
Case n = 2. The random variables X 1 , X 2 will be observed and the optimal stopping rule is found using backward induction. At observation 2 we must stop. At observation 1 we stop if
Thus x * 1 (α) must be found so that for x 1 ≥ x * 1 (α) the previous inequality holds. If α ≥ 1/2 and we observe a value less than 5, continuing give us a higher probability of win. The probability of win is
min 1,
For the given values of α, Table 2 below shows the corresponding x * 1 (α) and the respective win probability. The table suggests that for small values of α the Game Proportion of the Max can always be won. The following proposition generalizes this idea. Proof. First, we show that if (i) or (ii) then V * n,αmax (X) = 1. Consider τ := min{1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 : X i ≥ αM} or τ := n if no such i exists. Under either of the two conditions, it is trivial that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1,
And at observation n, if (i), we have P (X n ≥ α max{X 1 , . . . , X n−1 }| max{X 1 , . . . , X n−1 } < αM) ≥ P (X n ≥ m) = 1.
If (ii), we have P (X n ≥ α max{X 1 , . . . , X n−1 }| max{X 1 , . . . , X n−1 } < αM) ≥ P (X n ≥ m) = 1, since max{X 1 , . . . , X n−1 } < αM and X does not have mass between < X l . If we continue, we lose if for all l > 1, X l < m + αǫ. It follows that no stopping rule gives a win probability of 1 unless the interval I has probability 0. Hence (ii) must be satisfied. Remark 2.3. This result holds for any random variable while the Theorem is proven for a continuous random variable.
Example 2.4. Continuous Uniform Distribution on (0, 1)
Case n = 2. The random variables X 1 , X 2 will be observed and the optimal stopping rule is found using backward induction. At observation 2 we must stop. At observation 1 stop if
The probability of win is
This is graphed in Figure 1 . From the previous examples it can been seen that the optimal stopping rule is cumbersome to calculate since it depends on the common distribution. The probability of winning is in general high but, how low can the optimal win probability be in Game Proportion of the Max? The main result of this note provides the best lower bound.
3
A sharp lower bound.
To prove Theorem 1.1, a family of random variables is introduced with the property that the values are so spread out so that advantage in Game Proportion of the Max over Game Max is lost. In other words, the only possibility to win in Game Proportion of the Max is to choose the maximum of the sequence. Let N α = min{N ∈ N|α > 1 N } and consider the random variable X k,ǫ with density
The value of ǫ must be chosen such that for j = 1, . . . , k − 1, the inequality
holds. Solving, it is enough for ǫ to satisfy
The intervals where this density is positive are enough space out so that the gambler's advantage playing the Game Proportion of the Max over the Game Max is lost. The following lemma makes this precise.
Lemma 3.1. For every n ≥ 1, given δ > 0, there exists k > 1 such that
for any stopping rule τ adapted to X 1 , · · · , X n .
Proof. When n = 1, the result is trivial. Let n > 1 and δ > 0. The idea of the proof is that a gambler is observing the sequence and playing both games with the same strategy. It's straightforward that if he wins in the Game Max, he also wins in the Game Proportion of the Max but the converse may not be true. Thus,
where B is the event that the gambler wins in Game Proportion of the Max and loses in Game Max using the stopping rule τ . To simplify calculations, the following random variables are introduced. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let
then the event B is contained in the event where the sequence (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) does not have a unique maximum. It follows that P (B) ≤ P ((Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) does not have a unique maximum) = 1 − P ((Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) has a unique maximum).
For i = 1, . . . , n, let A i be the event that the sequence (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) has the unique maximum at observation i. These events are clearly mutually exclusive. Then
Since the unique maximum Z i = j for some j ∈ {2, . . . , k}, each A i can be expressed as the union of mutually exclusive events
and so
Now, the limit of the summation as k → ∞ is found:
since the summation on the left hand side is a Riemann sum of f (t) = t n−1 over
Then,
Thus (1) holds for X k δ ,ǫ . This completes the proof. Now, using the previous Lemma the proof of the Theorem is simple.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let n ≥ 1. It is straightforward that for any τ {X τ ≥ αM n } ⊇ {X τ ≥ M n }.
(If the gambler wins in Game Max, he also wins in Game Proportion of the Max), thus V n,αmax (X, τ ) ≥ V n,max (X, τ ).
In particular, when using the optimal stopping rule τ * of the Game Max in both games, it follows that V * n,αmax (X) ≥ V n,αmax (X, τ * ) ≥ V n,max (X, τ * ) = v * n,max
Now to prove that the bound is sharp, let δ > 0. By Lemma 3.1 there exists k δ such that for the X k δ ,ǫ distribution if the gambler uses the optimal stopping rule σ * for the Game Proportion of the Max in both games,
Thus for any δ > 0 there exists a distribution such that the optimal win probability in Game Proportion of the Max is at most v * n,max + δ. Hence the constant v * n,max is the best lower bound.
